The course provides an introduction to Kant's philosophy, concentrating on the Critique of Pure Reason and Kant's strategy for rendering 'theoretical philosophy' (epistemology & metaphysics) consistent with 'practical philosophy' (moral theory). The first week gives an overview of the novel concepts and principles introduced by Kant, and an outline of his system. We then look at the dualist foundations of each of its divisions: his analysis of theoretical cognition into conceptual and 'intuitive' components; and the parallel schism of duty and inclination that he posits in the practical sphere. These jointly pose the problem: Kant's theoretical philosophy tells us that without sense experience knowledge is impossible, while his practical philosophy maintains that moral cognition requires the exclusion of all sensory factors.

We then examine in the central weeks of the course selected chapters in the Critique of Pure Reason: first, the doctrine of transcendental idealism (the famous distinction of appearances and things in themselves) that follows according to Kant from his analysis of space and time; second, Kant's attempt to solve the problem created by his dualism of how sense and intellect can be united in the way required if we are to have knowledge of objects; third, the special mode of argument ('transcendental proof') that Kant devises to justify principles, such as the principle of causality, that are fundamental to our knowledge of objective reality but, as Hume has shown, lack empirical grounds; fourth, Kant's theory that human reason is necessarily and unavoidably plagued by speculative questions which it is unable to answer, and the specific impasse to which we are led by reflection on the self (the 'I' is ineliminable, yet we know nothing of its nature); fifth, the contradictions into which reason falls when it attempts to answer metaphysical questions concerning the constitution of the world as a whole (it both must be and cannot be finite, both must and cannot have a first cause, etc.); and finally Kant's resolution of the seeming contradiction of natural necessity and human freedom.

With this last topic we return to practical philosophy and take up the question of how the radical species of freedom which the moral law presupposes can be justified, despite its transcendence of the bounds of theoretical knowledge, and consider the different accounts offered by Kant in the Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason. At this point – if all has worked out – the two divisions of Kant's system, which initially appeared to be at odds with one another, are seen to be mutually supporting: the limitations on theoretical knowledge demonstrated in the Critique of Pure Reason are necessary conditions of moral consciousness, in which reason finds the fulfilment denied it in speculative metaphysics.

The weekly readings consist of manageable extracts from the Critique of Pure Reason and Kant's practical works. The course is designed in such a way that, as a cumulative picture of Kant's system builds up, each weekly topic can also be understood as concerned with an independent philosophical problem.

Philosophy Area C